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Friday, November 09, 2007
# Posted 11:33 AM by Taylor Owen
ONE ELECTION TOO EARLY?: In theory, I am sympathetic to Sullivan's thesis that Obama is a post-boomer candidate. In fact, I am sympathetic to most post-boomer theses. Including, recently, this one. Which is awesome. In practice, however, my sense is that it is at least one election too early for a successful post-boomer run. Not least of which because there are just so damn many of them. This of, course, should not prevent Obama himself from capitalizing on the positioning, which he appears to be doing: I think there's no doubt that we represent the kind of change that Senator Clinton can't deliver on and part of it is generational. Senator Clinton and others, they've been fighting some of the same fights since the '60's and it makes it very difficult for them to bring the country together to get things done. Labels: Obama (2) opinions -- Add your opinionThursday, November 08, 2007
# Posted 3:46 PM by Taylor Owen
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS FOREIGN POLICY: In light of recent developments in Pakistan, this might be a good time to post an exchange I had with Jeff Weintraub a few months ago on the subject of democracy promotion as a foreign policy meta-narrative. The first is his response to this blog post of mine. He is in Italics. Dear Taylor, SO LET ME GET THIS STRAIGHT...: The moment the democratically elected government [of the PA] is undemocratically reconfigured is the right time for aid to be re-instated? hmmm, now what lesson does this send to those for whom this aid is rightly intended? [....]Well, at least you recognize that this is "tangential." In this specific case, the aid was neither suspended nor restored in the name of "democracy promotion," but on the basis of other issues (as Patrick Porter correctly pointed out in his comment). No one claimed otherwise. So what's the problem? These are simply two disconnected points. However, if these points are supposed to be connected (as you seem to be suggesting in the overall discussion), then this strikes me as a bit of a non-sequitur. Your real point seems to be a call to reject "absolutist democracy promotion rhetoric". That sounds OK to me, depending on what "absolutist" means in this context. But what is it actually supposed to mean? You do on to say, for example ... Rather, I am making a judgment on those who claim that in certain cases the promotion of democracy is an absolute, and in other cases it is well, a little more flexible.This sounds mostly like a suggestion that some people are sometimes hypocritical (or confused), which is a fair polemical point. But on the face of it, the substantive argument being put forward here is a little confusing. If people treat support for democracy as "flexible" in some circumstances, then it's not being treated as "an absolute". So, again, what's the point? Your point seems to be this: Democracy can have good and bad implications, depending wholly on how free people choose to act. Foreign policy must therefore be based on more than simply its "promotion". It is not a particularly useful meta-narrative.The first two sentences here strike me as quite right, as far as they go. (As liberalhawk pointed out in his comment, the position laid out in these two sentences is precisely the rationale underlying US policy toward Hamas, Fatah, and the PA--whether or not you happen to think the specific details of that policy are sensible or not.) It is not a particularly useful meta-narrative.But that final sentence is either unclear or a non-sequitur. How does that follow from what came before? What if one argues that <a> supporting and promoting democracy (and democratic political forces) should be treated as an important general goal of foreign policy, which should not easily be abandoned for considerations of short-term expediency or alleged realpolitik, but at the same time <b> it should not be treated as the only important goal of foreign policy, and <c> we should also recognize that democratic regimes will only work in some circumstances and with certain conditions, so it is neither a universal panacea nor something that can simply be parachuted into any society at any time. That strikes me as a realistic (as distinct from "realist") approach ... and I suspect that it's one you might actually have some sympathy for, too. Bit if so, then the proper conclusion (it seems to me) is that the defense and promotion of democracy is a "useful meta-narrative" to help guide politics, diplomacy, and foreign policy--as long as it is not understood in an exclusive, unrealistic, or utopian manner. To put it another way, picking up on David Adesnik's useful comment, any effective long-term political perspective has to combine commitment to certain core principles with flexibility in practice and the recognition that we always confront multiple, often competing, goals and concerns. (I guess this is mostly just a restatement of Weber, which is OK with me.) Responding to this dilemma by simply abandoning the core principles--i.e., throwing out the baby with the bathwater--is actually a pretty "absolutist" solution itself, even if it masquerades as pragmatism (or "realism"). Yours for democracy (all things considered), Jeff Weintraub P.S. Also, by the way, describing the situation in the PA as "the moment the democratically elected government is undemocratically reconfigured" is a little odd, and somewhat misleading. It suggests that there has just been a Fatah/Abbas coup against Hamas, but matters are a little more complicated than that. Dear Jeff, Many thanks for taking the time to write. I hope that my reply shows a slightly greater deference to the subject matter than my admittedly flippant blog post. I think as you say, that it is best we treat these as two separate issues: The issue of recent US policy regarding the PLO, and the larger utility of democracy as a meta-narrative. First though, let me just say that I agree generally with much of what you propose. I think we would probably agree on the desired end goals of American foreign policy. I am simply uncertain whether democracy promotion is a useful meta-theme in order to achieve these ends. While absolutist might have been a bit harsh, there is certainly a degree of ideological doctrine that drives many to promote the spread of democracy at the cost other policy objectives. Objectives that I would consider more important than, and in many cases prerequisites for, successful democratic development. It is this that concerns me. First, the purpose of pointing out the discrepancy between the rhetoric of middle eastern democracy promotion and policy decisions regarding the democratically elected government of the PLO, was more to make the point that both you affirm, which is that democracy promotion is messy, and there are many interests that seem to override its promotion. In this case, the perceived threat to the security of an ally. You are right that whether this policy is actually in the best interest of the US is debatable. Many have argued that Hamas was actually willing to conceded more at the time of the election than at any other time in recent memory (the last constitution, now abandoned, seems to suggest this). This, one would think, would be precisely the time that one would want to engage with them, rather then promoting policies that re-radicalizes them. But, I do not know enough about this to say much more. I will leave that to others to take on. Regarding this fitting within the rhetoric of the Bush Administration, made by you and Libhawk. I respectfully disagree. I think that there is no doubt that neoconservatives put significantly more weight on the utility of democracy than simply ‘it may or may not be useful’. This seems to me to undercut the principle argument of neoconservatism, for better or worse. Indeed, the very underlying principle of current middle eastern policy is that democracy may be destabilizing, but in the long run, it is better for US interests. From this, however, their follows two perhaps. more interesting points on the nature of US foreign policy. First, if democracy promotion in the short run is very bad for people living through the transition, which research suggests it is, but is good for long term US interests, then clearly US foreign policy puts the later ahead of the former. Fine, this should be acknowledged. Second, does the manner in which democracy is promoted matter to the long term impact on US interests? Here, I would argue yes. A democracy is obviously not a static state, but rather a representation of its free people. If these people become free through a very violent externally imposed invasion, surely this will effect the end democratic state. If this is even close to correct, then the means of democracy promotion are just as important to US interests as the end democratic state they seek to establish. More thought to the means would also of course enhance the likelihood of bucking the first of these trends, the short term human security of those in the state we are engaging. On the question of absolutism, you are of course correct that that was hyperbole. However, it is equally disingenuous to claim relativism in the rhetorical use of ‘democracy promotion’ as meta-theme for current US foreign policy. Since the cold war, different people have taken different lines on the degree to which this should be THE guiding principle of US foreign policy. While none may be completely absolutists, I would suggests that some, including current neoconservatives, are ideologically doctrinaire. In the historical debate on the relative weight that should be placed on the promotion of democracy, or even of the democratic peace theory, neoconservatives certainly fall closer to absolutism than many other foreign policy ideologies. It is this, that I worry has a negative effect on the very things democracy is ideally indented to enable - Higher living standards, human rights, basic needs. Alternatively of course, liberal internationalists are on a different axis of this spectrum, believing that institutions should be promoted which first result in the betterment of the people who live under their mandates, and second, that allow for free and open societies to evolve peacefully. The point is, there is a spectrum, and depending where one puts democracy promotion, there are real policy consequences. i.e.) It was the hope of democracy promotion that put many over the edge in supporting the Iraq war. Regarding your sensible proposition that: “any effective long-term political perspective has to combine commitment to certain core principles with flexibility in practice and the recognition that we always confront multiple, often competing, goals and concerns” I would simply say: Unless, of course, said core principle does more damage than good. My main point here is not whether democracy is good or bad, but rather whether it is useful, not just as a theme, but as a meta theme of American foreign policy. For me, to be a useful meta-narrative, or core principle, many other principles of a desired foreign policy would fall under it without compromising the cohesiveness of the meta-narrative, or meta-policy. David points out that there always inconstancies in any ‘core principle’. But just how many inconsistencies are we willing to accept, and at what point do these inconsistencies threaten the very benefits the core principle is supposed to enable, ie, human rights, ect. I guess we all draw our own line here. I personally am simply not convinced that democracy promotion, in the Wilsonian, or Bush second inaugural sense, accomplishes this is a coherent way. The inconsistencies are too vast and the human costs too large. For me the costs to human security of forceful democracy promotion often will outweigh the long term benefits of a society which achieved its democracy through violent means. I simply believe that there are other, more beneficial uses for US force and influence, if the objective is the betterment of the human condition. What is more important than democracy promotion? To me, human security, which I believe is a far more useful overarching goal of an interventionist foreign policy. Of course, a state, democratic or otherwise, may be the cause of insecurity. But this is why we have principles such as r2p and institutions such as the ICC. These are objective to the form of governance, only caring about the treatment of the citizens by the state in question. I would also ask, whether a democratically elected society achieved through great bloodshed and misery, is better than a non-democratically elected society living in relative peace? This speaks to the problems of conflating democracy promotion with the promotion of basic human rights. The two are undoubtedly often in opposition. Particularly in the transition phase. To me it is simply insufficient to claim long run befits from short term misery in the promotion of democracy. Short term costs cannot be seen as extraneous, or worse, as necessary to the birth of a democratic state. Particularly one being transitioned by outside force. This to me, shows a blind faith in the utility of our actions which is profoundly disrespectful to societies in which we are engaging, or invading, as the case may be. Finally, on the selective use of a core principle, at what point does the false rhetoric surrounding democracy begin to negatively effect the very things democracy is supposed to enable? This can be far less tangible that polices that directly harm people, and involve the effects of a degraded US position in the world, the impact on the actions of other states and groups, and so on. Democracy promotion as a guiding principle, arguably also limits the positive impact the US can have in countries such as Iran, which are far more open to the human rights discourse, than that of US imposed democratic transition - i.e., regime change. Kind regards, Taylor Hi Taylor, Thanks for your serious and extensive response to my message. It probably won't surprise you to hear that we partly agree and partly disagree on the issues you raise. (These include some important questions you raise that I had thought of raising myself, regarding the complicated relationships between "human rights" and "democracy" as possible foreign-policy themes. In the broadest sense, I think we agree that these are partly distinct and partly connected, and I would also agree that there can sometimes be tensions between them, but I think you overdo those tensions and draw some conclusions that I find unwarranted. I also think that your discussion slides too easily from the question of <a> whether supporting and encouraging democracy should be an important goal to the quite different question of <b> whether invading countries with US troops and overthrowing there regimes is generally a good technique for establishing successful democratic regimes. Etc.) But I'm afraid I will have to put off spelling out the details, since I'm tied up with other things right now. Perhaps soon.... In the meantime, I did want to acknowledge receiving your message and thank you for taking the time & trouble to respond to mine. Enjoy yourself in Rome. Cheers, Jeff Weintraub Labels: democracy promotion (1) opinions -- Add your opinionMonday, November 05, 2007
# Posted 5:13 PM by David Adesnik
Maybe if the criticism were more persuasive, but John Judis of The New Republic has really done a third-rate job of trying to brand Giuliani as an extremist while praising him just enough to be fair enough for the pages of TNR. In his profile, Judis accuses Giuliani of nothing less than “a reluctance to cede power and a contempt for the democratic process.” Judis makes it sound like Giuliani is some sort of Putin. Judis basically argues that Giuliani's first term as mayor was a success, but then his inner demons prevailed. After being re-elected: Giuliani decided that he needed to suppress not only petty criminals, but also jaywalkers, street vendors, speeding bicycle messengers, and reckless taxi drivers. "If we don't act in a civil manner here, we can't thrive as individuals or as the capital of the world," Giuliani announced in February 1998. Giuliani's new campaign, billed "Creating a More Civil City," was met with strikes from cab drivers and food vendors, as well as angry reactions from citizens threatened with arrest for jaywalking. Giuliani finally gave up on it, but, the next year, he took on the New York art scene. He tried to stop the Brooklyn Museum from putting on a provocative show, "Sensation," which he called "sick stuff." Giuliani's attempt to cut off city funding for the museum and fire its trustees was defeated in court...It reminds me of that famous poem by Martin Niemoller about the Third Reich. First they came for the street vendors, and nobody protested. Then they came for the jaywalkers and nobody protested. Then they came for the Art Museum and nobody protested. Finally, they came for me and there was nobody left to protest. I tend to agree that Giuliani’s threats against the Brooklyn Museum were a political stunt. That’s not my kind of politics. But rather than any sort of contempt for the democratic process, it shows that Giuliani will engage in the sort of pandering that is part of our proud democratic tradition. But worse was yet to come: Perhaps the most telling example of Giuliani's attempt to expand his authority came after September 11. In the crisis created by the terrorist attacks, Giuliani excelled as a leader. He was calm and eloquent, a voice of reassurance while the president, aloft in Air Force One, remained curiously silent. But, even before the dust had settled over Ground Zero, Giuliani began lobbying the New York legislature to repeal the city's two-term limit so he could run again, while simultaneously pressuring the candidates vying for his office to accept a 90-day extension of his term. Giuliani's moves showed a reluctance to cede power and a contempt for the democratic process. It was a demonstration of how far he would go in the pursuit of authority.Lobbying. Pressuing. Forgive me for sounding a bit cynical, but does that represent contempt for the democratic process, or what democratic politics usually consists of? Coming from Judis and TNR, this kind of exaggeration makes me think that Democrats don’t have too much ammunition when it comes to Giuliani’s record. And if Giuliani were nominated, his campaign could proudly observe that even excessive critics like Judis credit him with: I grew up in New York City. I lived there until 1995 and visited often until 1999. What happened in New York seemed like a miracle. A city condemned to persistent failure and decline suddenly discovered its former glory. It really felt like the greatest city in the world. Labels: 2008, Rudy Giuliani (11) opinions -- Add your opinionWednesday, October 31, 2007
# Posted 12:41 AM by David Adesnik
I admit that I sympathize with his message. Yet after all the failures in Iraq before 2007, I'm still afraid of letting myself get too confident. All of the clear indications of progress seem too good to be true. Kagan lists some of them: In the past five months, terrorist operations in and around Baghdad have dropped by 59 percent. Car bomb deaths are down by 81 percent. Casualties from enemy attacks dropped 77 percent. And violence during the just-completed season of Ramadan--traditionally a peak of terrorist attacks--was the lowest in three years.It would be useful if the Standard provided links or footnotes. I have plenty of confidence in Kagan as analyst, but every statistic is a controversy in this war, so I'd like to go back to the sources and make sure the numbers are right. Anyhow, Kagan is crystal clear about the fact that we have won the battle but not the war. Not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan. And Iran looms on the horizon, still working against us in Iraq. We've got a long way to go. (16) opinions -- Add your opinion Sunday, October 28, 2007
# Posted 11:56 PM by David Adesnik
The report seemed pretty reasonable to me. According to its second paragraph: UNAMI recognizes the enormous difficulties facing the Iraqi Government in its efforts to restore law and order. Its law enforcement personnel are under relentless attack by insurgency groups, and both Sunni and Shi’a armed groups carry out direct attacks on civilians through suicide bombings, abductions and extrajudicial executions while making no distinction between civilians and combatants. Such systematic or widespread attacks against a civilian population are tantamount to crimes against humanity and violate the laws of war, and their perpetrators are subject to prosecution.That may seem pretty obvious, but I consider it a small victory when even the UN recognizes that anti-American forces are the actual perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Of course, the report by no means ignores any potential violations by the United States. It discusses the problem of armed contractors such as Blackwater as well as continuing concerns about the treatment of detainees. One of the most interesting sections, especially in light of the previous post, is the one about US air strikes and their relationship to civilian casualties. The UN reports an array of incidents in which 88 Iraqi civilians were "reportedly" killed. Why "reportedly"? That isn't clear. Presumably it's just a reminder that reliable data is very hard to come by in Iraq. Anyhow, assuming that 88 civilians were killed in the second quarter of the year, that number is in the same ballpark as IBC's assessment that 417 Iraqi civilians were killed by air strikes in the first nine months of the year. In a comment on an earlier post, one of our readers observed that The [UN] report makes it clear that U.S. air strikes in densely populated civilian areas are violations of international human rights law. A footnote to the section on "MNF military operations and the killing of civilians" explains, "Customary international humanitarian law demands that, as much as possible, military objectives must not be located within areas densely populated by civilians. The presence of individual combatants among a great number of civilians does not alter the civilian character of an area."That quotation is accurate, but the first sentence is rather misleading. The relevant section of the UN report (see p.9) never says that US air strikes targeted densely populated civilian areas or that US air strikes violated the laws of war. Perhaps that is what the footnote implies. But the quotation above hardly establishes a clear standard for how a counterinsurgent force should deal with an adversary that uses the population around it as camouflage or even human shields. Labels: civilian casualties, Iraq, United Nations (17) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 10:50 PM by David Adesnik
I don't buy it. It is essential, of course, to inflict as few civilian casualties as possible in the process of counterinsurgency operations. To that effect, Kaplan cites the Army's official manual for counterinsurgency operations, whose production was supervised by Gen. Petraeus shortly before his return to Iraq: An air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgents' benefits. … For these reasons, commanders should consider the use of air strikes carefully during [counterinsurgency] operations, neither disregarding them outright nor employing them excessively.If certain other generals were in charge, I might be seriously concerned that they were ignoring the sound doctrine elaborated by the Army's field manual. But my gut says that Petraeus is too smart to ignore his own good advice. What really matters, however, is not my gut. It's the evidence. Kaplan writes that: The research group Iraq Body Count estimates that 417 Iraqi civilians died from January to September of this year as a result of airstrikes. This is only a bit less than the estimated 452 deaths caused by airstrikes in the previous two years combined.I'm willing to give some weight to the IBC numbers, even though they are a far-left anti-war activist organization, not just a "research group". As OxBlog has shown in the past, IBC won't let the truth get in the way of their anti-war publicity efforts. But for the moment, let's assume that IBC got it right. Instead of 200+ civilian casualties, this year there will be around 500 inflicted by US airstrikes. According to iCasualties.org, approximately 15,000 Iraqi civilians have died since the beginning of this calendar year. If US airstrikes have accounted for 417 deaths, that would represent slightly less than 3% of the total. From a human perspective, that is still a tragedy. From a strategic perspective, I have a hard time believing that this kind of fluctuation would have a major impact on Iraqi public opinion. Yet Kaplan suggests that it does. In a companion piece, he reviews some recent public opinion data from Iraq which indicate that hostility to the US is rising. I haven't had time to review those data in detail, so I will simply observe for now that even Kaplan doesn't draw a clear connection between the public opinion data and the increase in air strikes. Aside from the IBC data, Kaplan points to another indicator that air strikes save American lives at the cost of Iraqi ones: In the first nine months of 2007, Air Force planes dropped munitions on targets in Iraq more often than in the previous three years combined.That is just plain bad analysis. The leading killer of US troops for quite a while has been the improvised explosive device, or IED. Our casualties have been down significantly over the past couple of months because so many fewer troops are being killed by IEDs. This month, 15 American troops have been killed by IEDs. In May, when US casualties were at their peak, we lost almost 90 soldiers and marines to IEDs. It should be pretty clear that air strikes can't protect our troops from IEDs. As Kaplan himself observes, air strikes get called in when troops are facing a tough objective, for example a fortified house with insurgents inside. In contrast, IEDs hit our patrols and convoys at the beginning of battle, often taking our forces by surprise. So, if using more air strikes can't explain our recent success on the battlefield, what can? On that point, I'll stick with the conventional wisdom. First and foremost, Coalition forces have forged a strategic alliance with numerous Sunni tribes, bringing them into the fight against Al Qaeda and giving us the intelligence necessary to be more effective in our own operations. In other words, progress on the political front has led to progress on the military front. Labels: civilian casualties, Iraq (2) opinions -- Add your opinionTuesday, October 23, 2007
# Posted 12:16 AM by David Adesnik
In almost all ways, Giuliani and McCain have been respectful rivals. At an earlier debate, Giuliani said that, if he weren't in the race, he probably would be endorsing McCain...Especially in New Hampshire, where the third-place McCain is only a few points behind Giuliani and even tied for second with Hizzoner in a recent poll. Labels: 2008, John McCain (22) opinions -- Add your opinionFriday, October 19, 2007
# Posted 11:33 PM by David Adesnik
WASHINGTON - On a dusty street in Samarra, a bustling city north of Baghdad, two brothers, 10 and 12, are carrying plastic bags of groceries home from the market. Approaching an intersection guarded by U.S. troops, they strip off their white undershirts and wave them in the air as they cautiously venture across. Suddenly, shots."Mundane". As if American soldiers killing white-flag waving Iraqi children were an everyday occurrence. Certainly it happens. The case described is taken directly from Army documents. Sadly, the Army denied the boys' father compensation for their deaths. The article continues: But for Iraqis such as the father and extended family of the two boys killed in Samarra in October 2005, nothing "explains or palliates their loss," said Gary Solis, a retired Marine officer and expert on military-civilian clashes who teaches law at Georgetown University. "The U.S. usually -- almost always -- becomes the object of the survivors' anger and hatred."This argument is both cliche and dead wrong. If killing innocent people translated directly into unpopularity, then the Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias would be the least popular forces in Iraq, not the US military. Yet article after article gets written in which civilian deaths inflicted by our forces are held up as the 'real' explanation of Iraqi resentment, without the author even bothering to ask about the impact on Iraqi public opinion of the tens of thousands of intentional murders committed by other Iraqis. Now, as you probably know, I firmly subscribe to the school of counterinsurgency doctrine that recommends the minimum necessary use of force (although the minimum is still considerable in the midst of war). I subscribe to this theory because there is an inevitable double standard in operation, whereby our adversaries can exploit ethnic, sectarian or other identities to ensure that we are judged more harshly for doing less damage. That is simply a challenge the counterinsurgent must overcome. To be fair, the Sun's correspondent observes that: American troops are exhaustively trained to avoid harming innocent civilians, and they operate under strict rules that govern when lethal force can be used. Unlike private security contractors, U.S. military clashes with civilians are routinely investigatedBut what is that kind of throw-away caveat worth in article that describes in gory detail only our tragic mistakes but never the enemy's atrocities? I also found it rather galling that the Sun first described several cases in which the US military found loopholes to avoid paying out compensation for civilian casualties, but only reported in the final paragraphs of the article that the US military has spent tens of millions of dollars on precisely that kind of compensation. If you only read the first half of this article, you'd be left with the impression that the US military regularly kills children and then tries to nickel-and-dime its way out of the problem. Labels: Iraq (19) opinions -- Add your opinion
# Posted 11:24 PM by David Adesnik
As Dan correctly points out, it is each campaign's foreign policy staff that actually writes the essay. But the staffs write what their candidates want, and the candidates approve only what they want, so this is not a trivial exercise. To this day, Condi's article from the 2000 campaign is frequently cited (if only to remind the audience that she once was a realist). Also, Dan's post about "engagement" as the fairy dust of foreign policy is a must. He's writing about John Edwards, but the lesson applies far more broadly. Labels: 2008, Hillary, John McCain (5) opinions -- Add your opinion
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